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COVID-19 and the Real Impossible 
 







This article approaches the COVID-19 pandemic as an inherently antagonistic 
phenomenon. To do so, it carries forward the philosophical contentions 
(“revolution”) that Žižek outlines in his Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World, 
as well as his wider work. With reference to the parallax Real and McGowan’s 
Hegelian contradiction, it is demonstrated that Žižek’s philosophical premises 
hold a unique importance in politically confronting COVID-19. Indeed, by 
drawing specific attention to the various ways in which our confrontations with 
the Real expose the limitations of our socio-ideological orders, it is argued that 
it is in these very limitations (which now structure, manage and curtail our social 
interactions) that the limits of the Real are transposed through the various 
“fictions” we employ to fight and perceive it. In outlining this confrontation, a 
focused discussion on the Real as “impossible” – a “characteristic” that affords 
an important political significance for the present context and its ongoing 
limitations – is provided. In conclusion, if the COVID-19 pandemic demands a 
new “commons” (as argued by Žižek), and if our response to the crisis should 
be one where the desires of the nation-state are regulated and controlled, then, 
it may not simply be enough that we “demand the impossible”. Instead, it is 





“But COVID-19 arises as a pandemic that plunges us into the 
unknown and breaks into each and every one of us. COVID-19 
breathes on the entire world. The same phenomenon for 
everyone, but to which everyone reacts differently, starting 
from their own singularity. Each with their own point of 
attachment which crystallizes in a unique and unpredictable 
way” 
François Ansermet (2020) 
 
With a rising death toll; disagreements over the viability of national lockdowns; 
and, national societies divided between those left at home and those required 
to continue their work caring for the elderly, treating the sick and stacking our 
supermarket shelves, the COVID-19 phenomenon continues to crystallize 
various “points of attachment”, which, as Ansermet asserts, remain both 
unique and unpredictable. More importantly, these attachments shed light on 
a number of significant antagonisms within our social, political and economic 
relations. Though COVID-19 did not create these antagonisms – “the 
distances, ruptures and conflicts in the social landscape were already 
profound before coronavirus changed our lives forever” (Theodoropoulos 
2020) – for the moment, there remains no suggestion that these difficulties will 
be surpassed “after” the pandemic. Instead, the effects of the virus, and its 
social, cultural, economic and political impact will, if anything, remain a 
prescient force post-2020. 
To this extent, the COVID-19 pandemic offers the potential to confront 
these antagonisms head-on, steered by the prospect of re-orientating our 
political and economic orders as well as reframing our philosophical outlook. 
Indeed, while offering one of the “first” analyses of the virus, the Slovenian 
philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, has brought together key strands from his political 
writing to provide what some have considered an “opportunistic” attempt to 
frame the virus in the guise of his own philosophical outlook (Žižek 2018, 
2020b, 2020c).1 Elsewhere, there has remained a unique academic frustration 
(mostly, via social media) against those who have sought to publish special 
journal editions, edited collections and commentary pieces on the virus and its 
impact.  
Ultimately, therefore, COVID-19 is an inherently antagonistic topic and 
one that remains intricately tied to our philosophical and theoretical 
oppositions. It is on this basis alone that Žižek’s work prescribes a unique 
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importance in politically confronting these antagonisms as well as posing 
“new” questions on how we might even begin to encounter them (Sharpe and 
Boucher 2010: 106-109). In fact, Žižek (2006b: 242, italics added) notes: 
 
We must … distinguish the experience of antagonism in its radical 
form, as a limit of the social, as the impossibility around which the 
social field is structured, from antagonism as the relation between 
antagonistic subject-positions: in Lacanian terms, we must distinguish 
antagonism as Real from the social reality of the antagonistic fight. 
 
It is the purpose of this article to consider in what ways COVID-19 elicits this 
Real antagonism as well as the limits and impossibilities it avers. 
In what follows, due attention will be given to outlining Žižek’s 
application of the Lacanian Real, drawing specific attention to the ways in 
which our confrontations with the Real expose the limitations of our socio-
ideological orders. Furthermore, while these limitations can be used to draw 
out some of the underlying antagonisms that COVID-19 reveals, its Real 
significance can be found in the multiplicity of symbolizations it encourages, 
matched only by its apparent capacity to resist these very symbolizations. In 
part, this requires a focused consideration on the Real as “impossible” – a 
“characteristic” that affords an important political significance for the present 
context and its ongoing limitations. 
 
The Real – a contingent unknown 
 
In his philosophical, political and cultural analyses, the Lacanian Real has 
maintained an important significance in Žižek’s (2017) critical outlook. In its 
simplest description, the Real stands in contrast to what we typically perceive 
as “common sense” reality (Taylor 2010: 67). Though it does not sit “behind” 
or “beyond” this reality, it does constitute a “void” or “gap” within the socio-
symbolic orders that we use to structure and orientate our lives. The 
significance of this “gap” can be observed when we consider the Real in 
relation to Lacan’s Symbolic and Imaginary orders, which constitute his triadic 
Borromean knot. 
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Together, both the Symbolic and Imaginary reflect a form of 
signification, with the Symbolic denoting how “reality” is represented through 
language, and the Imaginary referring to those “images” which fantasmatically 
constitute one’s individual outlook. Notably, while the Symbolic is open to 
variance and difference, the Imaginary exposes a certain “arresting fantasy”, 
which underscores the subject’s sense of self (Žižek and Daly 2004: 7). It is 
against these orders that we trace how the Real serves as the necessary 
inverse to both the Symbolic and Imaginary: that is, for the Symbolic and 
Imaginary to exist, the Real is required. 
Admittedly, this brief description does not capture the enigmatic quality 
of the Real. Indeed, while the Real serves as the antimony to our Symbolic-
Imaginary constructions, it maintains a certain immateriality (“void”/”gap”). 
That is, it can only be approached, grasped or observed through its disturbing 
effects. These effects are “associated with experiences of breakdown not only 
of phenomenological experience, but even of language or culture itself” 
(Carew 2014: 3), and it is in this respect that such experiences bestow the 
Real a disruptive potential; a level of contingency which is apparent when our 
day-to-day proceedings are suddenly, and, in some instances, irrevocably, 
changed.  
Nevertheless, though the Real can be found in moments of traumatic 
disarray, importantly, any recourse to “contingency” can just as easily serve 
as a form of domestication which inevitably seeks to contextualize the Real’s 
effects by affording it some sense of meaning. It is this desire to provide 
meaning which helps support and maintain certain ideological fantasies, 
which inevitably transpose such contingency to an external agency, be it an 
unwanted other or “the enemy” beyond the gates. 
In part, these examples offer one way of providing contingent events a 
deeper sense of meaning, and, here, COVID-19 offers no exception. While 
the virus can be, and has been, viewed as a form of punishment against 
humanity (Monbiot 2020), there remains “something reassuring in the fact that 
we are punished, [that] the universe (or even Somebody-out-there) is 
engaging with us” (Žižek 2020c: 14). For Žižek (2020c: 14, italics added): 
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The really difficult thing to accept is the fact that the ongoing epidemic 
is a result of natural contingency at its purest, that it just happened and 
hides no deeper meaning. In the larger order of things, we are just a 
species with no special importance. 
 
To this extent, Žižek’s “contingency at its purest” draws attention to how a 
certain level of contingency persists in “those areas of life which cannot be 
known” (Myers 2003: 25). It is this sense of the “unknown” which underscores 
how our understanding of the world, and our relation to conventional notions 
of reality, are always mediated and carved-up through language. 
What is important, however, is not to confuse the above assertions with 
Kant’s noumena and phenomena distinctions – from which our ability to 
access the noumena remains forever out of reach – but, instead, to consider 
how our relation to/with the Real is always constructed a posteriori. That is, if 
the Real can be posited in the displacements that it effects, then such 
deformations can only ever be grasped through our Symbolic and Imaginary 
orders. To this end, the Real is what “inhabits language from within, 
generating a surplus of meaning, and a void of unanswered, unresolved 
questions” (Wilcox 2005: 352, italics added). It is through such an inhabitance 
that the Real can be encountered. Žižek explains: 
 
for Lacan the Real is not what is forever there, absolutely immutable 
and so on. … The fundamental wager, or hope, of psychoanalysis is 
that with the symbolic you can intervene in the Real. … And the point is 
that through symbolic intervention these structures can be transformed. 
The Real is not some kind of untouchable central point about which 
you can do nothing except symbolize it in different terms. … So the 
basic wager of psychoanalysis is that you can do things with words; 
real things that enable you to change modes of enjoyment and so on. 
(Žižek and Daly 2004: 150) 
 
Consequently, we can “touch the [R]eal” through new interpretations and new 
forms of meaning (Leblanc 2020), which, in Žižek’s political writing, can be 
seen to highlight how “The Real is no longer the eternal circulating form of 
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political failure, but rather the point of intervention to violently and radically 
alter the coordinates of the existing capitalist order” (Noys 2010: 8). This 
intervention seeks to use the “gap” (the Real), constitutive of the Symbolic, as 
a form of “motivation” (Hearns-Branaman 2014: 31), that can posit “a radical 
openness in which every ideal support of our existence is suspended” (Žižek 
2008b: 9). 
Viewed in this light, the Real maintains a significant structuring role for 
the subject. Though “The Real needs mediating … it continues to bubble 
under the surface of the Symbolic and Imaginary constructions we use for that 
mediation” (Taylor 2010: 70), and, as such, it is through this mediation that the 
Real remains coterminous with the inconsistences and contingent failures of 
the Symbolic order. Certainly, while the Real is “unknown”, it persists in a 
fundamental and elementary form, so that, rather than overcoming the Real, 
we are required “to learn to recognize it in its terrifying dimension and then, on 
the basis of this fundamental recognition, to try to articulate a modus vivendi 
with it” (Žižek 2008a: xxviii). It is this dialectical tension which underscores 
how “the Real is simultaneously presupposed and posed by the symbolic” 
(Žižek 2008a: 191). In short, there is an “intangible role” to the Real, which 
“provid[es] a certain invisible-immanent twist that gives shape and texture to 
reality” (Žižek and Daly 2004: 8). 
We can approach this dialectical “twist” in “the inherent twist/curvature 
that is constitutive of the subject itself” (Žižek 2020a: 37). Indeed: 
 
in order for the subject to emerge, the impossible object-that-is-subject 
must be excluded from reality, since it is its very exclusion which opens 
up the space for the subject. The problem is not to think the real 
outside transcendental correlation, independently of subject; the 
problem is to think the real INSIDE the subject, the hard core of the 
real in the very heart of the subject, its ex-timate center. (Žižek 2020a: 
37-38) 
 
Such “extimacy” (and inherent externality) can be identified in the subject’s 
imaginary formations, which continually seek to locate the Real as the 
impossible outside, or, as that contingent event whose impossibility demands 
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explanation. Importantly, it is this impossible limit which affords a positivization 
of the void or gap that is the Real (Žižek 2008a: 195).2 
In what follows, further consideration will be given to elaborating upon 
how the Real posits a certain “impossibility” that can prove uniquely helpful in 
approaching the political significance of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be 
argued that by engaging with this “impossibility”, important political 
possibilities can be drawn. 
 
Identifying the (Possible) Impossible 
 
What the above discussion hopes to avoid is the Real’s reification. It is in view 
of this potential for reification, as well as fetishization, that Žižek considers the 
Real “a topological term” from which “any substantilization … is a kind of a 
perspective-illusion” (Žižek and Daly 2004: 78 see also Žižek 2020a: 219-
272). What is important, however, is that such an “illusion” is not caused by 
any “positive entity”, but from the inherent paradox that constitutes the Real 
itself (Žižek and Daly 2004: 78-79). The paradox here is that the symbolic 
space remains predicated on its own “impossibility”, a paradox which bears 
witness to the fact that the Real happens; indeed, “the whole point of the 
Lacanian concept of the Real is that the impossible happens” (Zupančič 2003: 
176). 
Certainly, there are, as noted, various ways in which this impossibility 
can be ignored or obscured. The “impossible that happened” can be 
fetishized, thus transforming the impossible into a “virtue of … impossibility” 
(Zupančič 2003: 178), and it can be avoided, via forms of fantasmatic 
disavowal that seek to deny or mask the impossible. Equally, transgressions 
which seek to reach for the “impossible” can be used to support hegemonic 
ideologies, which presuppose such inherent transgression as part of their 
ideological efficiency. In each case, what effectively transpires is what 
Zupančič (2003: 177) refers to as a move “from ‘the impossible happened’ to 
‘this cannot possibly happen,’ ‘this is impossible’”. 
In these instances, we are again led to a domestication of the Real. 
This can be seen in the multitude of “possibilities” that result in a particular 
event as well as the possible scenarios that such an event may entail for the 
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future. Here, the “actuality” of a particular event is evidenced in Žižek’s (1998: 
157) contention that “there is always something traumatic about the raw 
factuality of what we encounter as ‘actual’; actuality is always marked by an 
indelible brand of the (real as) ‘impossible’”. In so doing: 
 
The shift from actuality to possibility, the suspension of actuality 
through inquiry into its possibility, is therefore ultimately an endeavor to 
avoid the trauma of the real, i.e., to integrate the real by means of 
conceiving it as something that is meaningful within our symbolic 
universe. (Žižek 1998: 157) 
 
This leads back to our previous discussion on contingency, and, in particular, 
how “the intrusion of the Real” is “what did not belong to the domain of 
possibilities”, but which, “all of a sudden – contingently – takes place, and 
thus transforms the coordinates of the entire field” (Žižek 2006a: 77). Such 
contingency can be traced in the distinction “between real impossibilities and 
the impossibilities of the real”; one that McGowan (2015: 38) clarifies as that 
between “the existence of a unicorn and the collapse of the Soviet Union”, 
with the latter reflecting a “possible impossible”. It is on these grounds that the 
Real can reveal a certain “openness”, the “irreducible contingency” of a 
“possibility”, that, once it occurs, was objectively necessary (Žižek 1998: 156). 
While this discussion pays dividend to the dialectical nature of possibility and 
actuality, contingency and necessity, what it helps to draw attention to are 
those impossible interruptions that the Real avers. 
We can draw out this importance via Zupančič’s (2008: 162) 
comparisons with “the Deleuzian Real”: a Real that “ultimately refers to the 
cosmic whole as an inherently productive self-differentiating substance”. 
Accordingly, while Deleuze’s turn to difference ultimately “obliterates the Real 
that keeps repeating itself in this difference”, for psychoanalysis, and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis in particular, it is an allegiance to “the rift, the crack, 
implied by yet invisible in the deployment of differences, and repeated with 
them” that is affirmed by the Real (Zupančič 2017: 118). Such repetition can 
only ever be grasped and confronted via the Real’s distortion, which, itself, 
results in the retroactive framing of such difference to begin with. 
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In accounting for this difference, further clarification can be given to 
acknowledging Žižek’s (2006a) “parallax Real”. According to Dean (2014: 
223), “there are two aspects to the parallax Real: multiplicity and its 
impossible core”. By extending Lacanian conceptions of the Real, a parallax 
perspective allows us to see that the Real is not necessarily what, following 
Lacan, “always returns to its place”, but rather, is “the hard bone of contention 
which pulverizes the sameness into the multitude of appearances” (Žižek 
2006: 26). It is in this sense that the Real “persists” through the impossibility 
of ever achieving a holistic perspective, so that one can only ever achieve a 
“shift in perspective”, from which each perspective either stalls or snaggs on 
the Real’s “hard bone of contention” (Žižek 2006a: 187). 
It is this contention which reveals how “The Real … is retroactively 
posited as the necessary yet impossible cause of this very multiplicity” (Dean 
2014: 223). What drives this retroactive positing, however, is the concern that 
there is some “pre-synthetic Real” unbeholden to the multiple (re)productions 
it later assumes (Žižek 2000: 33). What is important is that “this 
mythical/impossible starting point, the presupposition of imagination, is 
already the product, the result of, the imagination’s disruptive activity” (Žižek 
2000: 33), and, thus, exposes the retroactive positing of the subject itself. 
Though “this mythical/impossible starting point” pays homage to the Real, as 
that “hard bone of contention” which can only ever be accessed through 
multiple variations (hence, its “openness”), more importantly this clarification 
helps to highlight that while “the impossible is always possible”, ultimately, “we 
can arrive at it only by grasping how narrowly our choices are constrained 
within the symbolic structure” (McGowan 2015: 39). This constrainment 
remains an integral part of the inherent limits that frame both the subject and 
society. 
Indeed, to help elucidate on this constrainment, we can draw attention 
to Žižek’s (2020a) account of Adorno’s (2004) “negative dialectics”, where he 
argues: 
 
“Negative dialectics” designates a position which includes its own 
failure, i.e., which produces the truth-effect through its very failure. To 
put it succinctly: one tries to grasp or conceive the object of thought; 
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one fails, missing it, and through these very failures the place of the 
targeted object is encircled, its contours become discernible. (Žižek 
2020a: 53-54) 
 
Akin to the role of the corpse in Copjec’s (2015) analysis of detective fiction, 
Adorno’s (2004) “negative dialectics” is one that draws attention to the “limit” – 
the missed/failed object – that underscores the immanent impossibility of the 
position that is held; a self-negating process which produces its own “truth-
effect” (Žižek 2020a: 53-54). What Žižek’s (2020a) reference to Adorno 
reveals is the structural inconsistency of both language and phenomenal 
experience, and to the Real which “shows itself negatively through their 
immanent obstruction” (Carew 2014: 3).3 It is this Real which “provid[es] a 
certain invisible-immanent twist that gives shape and texture to reality” (Žižek 
and Daly 2004: 8). 
What remains significance in this “twist” is that it underscores the 
process of scientific inquiry, from which any “scientific insight” is itself 
predicated on a level of abstraction that nonetheless requires greater 
“scientific” complexity. It is here that our experience and representation of 
“objective reality” relies upon certain “impossible” abstractions in order to be 
“perceived” (Žižek 2015: 10). In short, this abstraction presents a suspension 
of one’s immediate reality, in favor of scientific formulas and algorithms as 
well as concepts and principles, which, while helping to symbolically frame 
this reality, remain far removed from any immediate, and, in some cases, 
rational, perception (what you see and feel). 
In this respect, scientific theories posit a decidedly “‘inhuman’ realm”, 
one that is only accessible through forms of scientific abstraction, as evident 
in new apparatuses that help generate the Real in “reality” (Žižek 2016: 32). In 
fact, “with a diameter from 20 to 300 nano-meters (one millionth of a 
millimeter)”, Focchi (2020) highlights how “the [COVID-19] particle that 
currently undermines our lives and modifies our habits remains essentially 
invisible, unless we have that indispensable electron microscope that not all of 
us usually have in our toolbox”. 
It is on this basis that science presents a “cut” in the Real;4 it presents 
a level of inquiry that, in order to engage in “objective reality”, requires a loss 
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of ontological consistency for the “subject”. This loss of the subject’s 
substantive consistency is reflected by the fact that “some part of [… reality] 
must be affected by the ‘loss of reality’” (Žižek 2001: 66), as evident in the 
abstract generalizations (the Real) that science relies upon.5 For the 
biosciences, what is affected in this loss is the subject as a substantial being; 
reduced, instead, to its biological form. Accordingly, while there remains a 
“monstrosity” in science; one that “enables us to construct new ‘unnatural’ 
(inhuman) objects which cannot but appear to our experience as freaks of 
nature (gadgets, genetically modified organisms, cyborgs, etc.)” (Žižek 2016: 
285), equally, it is through science that what makes the “human”, “human”, is 
paradoxically reduced to a meaningless biological materiality – an “inhuman” 
collection of bio-statistical information, far removed from the “human” inner 
sense of self. 
For this, we can reflect upon the fact that forms of “biological 
naturalism” continue to remain inextricably tied to the importance of the 
“gene”. Conceived as a “noncontradictory figure of authority”, genetic 
references present a level of determinism which suggest that “The self-
identical gene knows what it wants and pursues its aim with a ruthless 
purpose” (McGowan 2019: 150). As McGowan (2019) outlines, such thinking 
envelops the gene with an authority, grounded in its own self-evident 
persistence. However, what this approach seeks to dissipate, but, ultimately, 
obscures, is the “irreducible contradiction”, which finds itself reflected in a 
non-contradictory, neurotic fantasy of “genetic” authority – a fantasy that, 
nonetheless, continues to rely upon its own self-contradiction (McGowan 
2019: 152).6 
Notably, McGowan’s (2019) work offers further insight on the 
importance of this contradiction via his account of Hegel’s dialectical 
philosophy. For McGowan (2019: 9), what steers Hegel away from misguided 
interpretations of dialectical synthesis, is the assertion that his approach to 
dialectics presents contradiction as “a prerequisite of being”. McGowan’s 
(2019: 9) Hegelian contention is that “One must integrate the ultimate 
inevitability of contradiction into the fabric of one’s thought in order to avoid 
betraying its constitutive role”. One must, in other words, approach 
contradiction as an “affirm[ation] that our conceptual distance from the world 
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is actually our mode of access to it” (McGowan 2019: 128); a form of access 
that is itself constitutive of the aforementioned limits, failures and 
inconsistencies that the Real inscribes. 
It is in this regard that Žižek (2016: 102) contests that “‘contradiction’ is 
the Real itself”; indeed, a point of impossible coincidence: 
 
we do not magically overcome the impossibility which cuts across the 
symbolic – rather, we grasp how this impossibility which seemed to 
keep us apart from the Real, which rendered the Real impossible, is 
the very feature which locates the symbolic in the Real. The Real is not 
beyond the symbolic, it is the impossibility inscribed at its very heart. 
(Žižek 2015: 108, italics added) 
 
As noted, there are various ways in which this “impossibility” can be avoided; 
what we can infer, however, is that such deferment presents a particular 
aversion of contradiction. In particular, we can consider how such aversions to 
contradiction echo the mitigation of the gaze in the operation of ideology. The 
effects of this are helpfully outlined in McGowan’s (2015: 79, italics added) 
account of cinema: 
 
The primary way that ideology operates in the cinema is not (as Screen 
theory contends) through identification with the camera or with the 
characters on the screen but through the depiction and subsequent 
resolution of the gaze. The resolution of the gaze occurs within a 
fantasy that accomplishes the impossible. In the course of this 
ideological operation, the impossible real becomes a symbolic 
possibility, and the real thus disappears from view. Films that perform 
this operation have an inherently pacifying effect on spectators. They 
work to convince the spectator that the trauma of the real is actually 
nothing but a temporary symbolic hiccup. 
 
Do we not see something similar in the various attempts to manage, control 
and resolve (however successfully) the COVID-19 pandemic? While in no way 
critical of these attempts (clearly, some of them should be followed), 
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ultimately, they neither divest nor deny the virus. Instead, “we can see all 
there is to see except that which constitutes the field of vision by falling out of 
it” – the virus itself (Zupančič 2016: 420, italics added). Therefore, “In order to 
see something of this fallen out element, we have to look elsewhere: for 
example in our social interactions and in the ‘fictions’ that structure these 
interactions” (Zupančič 2016: 420). Indeed, these structures are made evident 
in the various forms of social distancing that now manage our interactions and 
in the computer generated compositions that seek to give an image to the 
virus.7 Consequently, in the face of COVID-19, it is in the very limitations that 
now structure, manage and curtail our social interactions that the limits of the 
Real are transposed through the various “fictions” we employ to fight and 
perceive it. More importantly, “It is only in this way, and not by looking at 
things directly and realistically, that we can get some idea about the real at 
work in social reality” (Zupančič 2016: 420-421). 
 
The Impossible Happens 
 
While we can conceive of our various attempts to make sense of and manage 
the virus as mere “speculation”, a point made clear in the daily news updates 
and conflicting (even dangerous) stories that have littered social media (BBC 
2020); equally, we can just as easily observe how “The increasingly 
unmanageable dimension of our economic crisis is evidenced by the 
embarrassment accompanying any political attempt to contain it through 
warmed-up neo-Keynesian recipes or (worse) calamitous neoliberal 
injunctions” (Vighi 2020). However, such an “unmanageable dimension” does 
not present the absence of any ready-made solution. Rather, what it serves to 
suggest is the failure to find the “right” dimension to approach the problem. 
Zupančič (2017: 139) explains: 
 
we have not lost the Real (which we never “had”), we are losing the 
capacity of naming that can have real effects, because it “hits” the right 
spot, the (dis)junction between the necessary and the Real 
(impossible). In all the profusion of words and more words, we lack the 
words that work. … The right word is not the same thing as a correct 
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word, and it is certainly not about someone “being right” (or not); it is 
not simply the word that conveys, for example, the factual truth of what 
is going on. This is not about “efficiency” either. It is about words that 
name something about our reality for the first time, and hence make 
this something an object of the world, and of thought. There can be 
words and descriptions of reality prior to it, and there always are. But 
then there comes a word that gives us access to reality in a whole 
different way. It is not a correct description of a reality; it introduces a 
new reality. 
 
These new significations – or attempts to find the word – help to frame the 
various ways in which the virus serves to entangle itself, not just in our 
biological make-up, but also our social and political relations. Though the 
word “coronavirus” was largely unheard of before the start of 2020, it now 
reveals a “new reality”, one that can allow us to access the inherent failure, 
limitation and contradiction of our social, economic and political orders. 
In order to perceive this “access”, we can begin to trace how the 
COVID-19 pandemic reveals something that we had previously considered 
“impossible”, and it is here that our attempt to define the contours of this 
“impossible” remain important. Indeed, while the “possibility” of a global 
pandemic “existed” in our Hollywood fantasies,8 the “impossibility” of the 
coronavirus – that is to say, its actuality – points to what was previously 
considered to be “impossible” according to our social, political and economic 
coordinates. Indeed, the failure to account for the virus and its global impact is 
not a limitation that existed a priori, but is, instead, a point of action – a Real-
impossible actuality (Žižek 1998, 2013, 2015). Here, “An act is more than an 
intervention into the domain of the possible – an act changes the very 
coordinates of what is possible and thus retroactively creates its own 
conditions of possibility” (Žižek 2013: 143). 
In this way, what this unexpected phenomenon presents us with is the 
de-ontologization of our former ideological templates (Vighi, 2020). This 
argument is taken further by Vighi (2020), who illustrates how “the 
ontologisation of labour is the elementary ideological template through which 
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all capitalist societies affirmed themselves, as indeed did socialist ones”. He 
elaborates:  
 
Differently put, the dogma of labour-time is the specifically modern form 
of alienation without which homo economicus loses its ontological 
compass, no longer knowing what to do with themselves. In this 
respect, Covid-19 impacts our lives by depriving them, at least 
momentarily, of their symbolic substance. (Vighi 2020) 
 
Indeed, the extent to which “this specific artifice is losing its socio-ontological 
efficacy” is one that not only accounts for how “the structural crisis of 
capitalism, accelerated by the virus” is made visible, but how such visibility 
renders clear that the secrets of capitalism rely on an inherent “absent 
substance” (surplus-value) upon which the system depends (Vighi, 2020). For 
Vighi (2020), this “minus passed off as a plus” is profit – an element that for 
capitalism is always lacking and never enough. Accordingly: 
 
While Marx resolved the riddle of surplus-value within the context of 
capitalist exploitation and profit-making, he did not see that the answer 
to the riddle posed by surplus-value is that there is no answer – 
surplus-value makes the world tick as the signifier of an impossibility. 
(Vighi, 2020). 
 
Yet, if, as Vighi (2020) proposes, “The empty foundation, … must not be 
ignored or rejected, but assumed and re-signified as the ground of a new 
social bond emerging against and beyond the moribund capitalist narrative”, 
then it is a re-signification which demands an equally re-signified conception 
of the subject – one open to the contradictory nature of being. 
Consequently, while it is in this sense that we can consider how “The 
subject is the nonsubstance; he exists only as a nonsubstantial self-relating 
subject that maintains its distance toward inner-worldly objects” (Žižek 1991: 
66), what is significant is that this distance is not a “safe distance”. Instead, it 
requires a Hegelian double reversal; a “negation of negation” that posits the 
limitations and contradictions underscoring both our past as well as present 
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responses to the virus. Ultimately, it is a distance that remains intimately tied 
to the contradictions in reason and the negation its purports (McGowan 2019). 
Indeed, for McGowan (2019: 75), “Rather than marking the subject’s 
dispassionate turning away from the world, the turn to reason indicates the 
presence of a distortion in the subject’s understanding of the world 
occasioned by the inclusion of its desire in this understanding”. Though, as 
McGowan (2019: 78) asserts, “reason is the apprehension of … 
contradiction”, this contradiction can be apprehended in the very “limits of the 
possible and the impossible” (Žižek 2013: 144). This is not a recourse to 
identifying what is “possible” within our present orders, but, as evident in 
Žižek’s (2020c) recourse to Communism, an attempt to identify those 
“impossible limits” (the Real) within our present ideological configurations, 
which declare what is “possible” and “impossible” (Žižek 2013). 
Moreover, this limit is there within the “self-limitations” that our “self-
interested acts” prescribe (Flisfeder 2020), and which, under the guise of 
COVID-19, bear witness to the fact that the unconscious attachments that 
these “self-interested acts” rely upon, require a universality beholden to a 
public, collective response. If the COVID-19 pandemic demands a new 
“commons”, and if our response to the crisis should be one where the desires 
of the nation-state are regulated and controlled, then, it may not simply be 
enough that we “demand the impossible”. Instead, it is today that the 





1 For a critique of Žižek’s Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World (2020c), see 
Baroud and Rubeo (2020) and Lucas (2020). Notably, many of the critiques which 
have been levelled at the book ignore the fact that Žižek chose to publish the book 
via a small, independent publisher (who no doubt has greatly appreciated the 
attention the publication has received), and that all royalties from sales of the book 
will be donated to Médecins Sans Frontières. 
2 It is on this basis that the subject can be defined as an “‘answer of the Real’ … we 
can inscribe, encircle the void place of the subject through the failure of his 
symbolization, because the subject is nothing but the failure of the process of his 




3 Zupančič (2003: 176) offers further insight on this via her account of love and the 
fantasies which underscore our “love stories”: “This ‘immanent inaccessibility’ also 
explains the basic fantasy of love stories and love songs that focus on the 
impossibility involved in desire. The leitmotiv of these stories is: ‘In another place, in 
an-other time, somewhere, not here, sometime, not now.’ This attitude (which clearly 
indicates the transcendental structure of desire: time and space as a priori conditions 
of our experience) can be read as the recognition of an inherent impossibility, an 
impossibility that is subsequently externalized, transformed into some empirical 
obstacle”. 
4 This is given further clarification in Daly’s account of the “symbolic Real” (Žižek and 
Daly 2004: 8-9). 
5 With regard to physics, McGowan (2019: 117) notes how “In order to make sense 
of physical reality, scientists must disregard what appears in our experience if they 
are to avoid missing reality altogether”. 
6 McGowan (2019: 149-153) supplements his critique of “naturalism” with a 
corresponding account of the role of fundamentalism and its recourse to neurotic 
fantasy. 
7 Importantly, Focchi (2020) notes that, “this image is not a photo, it’s a CGI 
(Computer Generated Image); a semblance, in short. It’s a digital illustration, and it’s 
a bit like the images of fairy tales we read when we were kids. We had never seen 
the Ogre in flesh, but his picture was in the book: having him on a page that could be 
opened, but also closed, somehow reassured us”. 
8 The films Outbreak (Wolfgang Petersen 1995), Contagion (Soderbergh 2011) and I 




Adorno, T. (2004) Negative Dialectics, London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Ansermet, F. (2020) To Each His Own Pandemic. Available at: 
http://www.thelacanianreviews.com/to-each-his-own-pandemic/. Accessed March 
26th 2020. 
 
Baroud, R and R. Romana (2020) Will the Coronavirus Change the World? On 
Gramsci’s “Interregnum” and Žižek’s Ethnocentric Philosophy. Available at: 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/04/29/will-the-coronavirus-change-the-world-on-
gramscis-interregnum-and-Žižeks-ethnocentric-philosophy/. Accessed April 29th 
2020. 
 
BBC (2020) Coronavirus: Twitter will label Covid-19 fake news. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-52632909. Accessed May 12th 2020 
 
Carew, J. (2014) “‘Why Is There Nothing Rather Than Something?’ – Less Than 




Copjec, J. (2015) Read My Desire, London, UK: Verso. 
 
Dean, J. (2014) “The Real Internet,” in M. Flisfeder and L-P. Willis (eds.) Žižek and 
Media Studies: A Reader, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Flisfeder, M. (2020) Social Distancing and its Discontents. Available at: 
http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/social-distancing-and-its-discontents/ Accessed: 
May 8th 2020. 
  
Focchi, M. (2020) # 23312. Available at: http://www.thelacanianreviews.com/23312-
2/ Accessed March 21st 2020. 
 
Hearns-Branaman, J.O. (2014) “Journalistic professionalism as indirect control and 
fetishistic disavowal,” Journalism 15: 21-36. 
 
Lawrence, F., director (2007) I Am Legend, Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. 
 
Leblanc, V. (2020) To Intervene. Available at: http://www.thelacanianreviews.com/to-
intervene/ Accessed April 8th 2020 
 
Lucas, S. (2020) The First Book About the Coronavirus is Here, and It’s Terrible. 
Available at: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/scottlucas/slavoj-Žižeks-new-
coronavirus-book-glamorizes-wuhans-misery. Accessed: April 9th 2020. 
 
McGowan, T. (2015) Psychoanalytic Film Theory and the Rules of the Game, New 
York, NY: Bloomsbury. 
 
McGowan, T. (2019) Emancipation After Hegel, New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Monbiot, G. (2020) COVID-19 is nature’s wake-up call to complacent civilization. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/covid-19-is-
natures-wake-up-call-to-complacent-civilisation. Accessed: March 25th 2020. 
 




Noys, B. (2010) “The Horror of the Real: Žižek’s Modern Gothic,” International 
Journal of Žižek Studies, 4: 1-13 
 
Petersen, W., director (1995) Outbreak, Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. 
 
Sharpe, M. and G. Boucher (2010) Žižek and Politics, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
 
Soderbergh, S., director (2011) Contagion, Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. 
 
Taylor, P.A. (2010) Žižek and the Media, Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
 
Theodoropoulos, P. (2020) Tug of class war: Agamben vs Žižek on the impact of 
Covid-19. Available at: https://freedomnews.org.uk/tug-of-class-war-agamben-vs-
Žižek-on-the-impact-of-covid-19/. Accessed: April 25th 2020 
 
Vighi, F. (2020) The Absent Cause: Time, Work and Value in the Age of Coronavirus. 
Available at: https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/the-absent-cause-time-work-and-
value-in-the-age-of-coronavirus/ Accessed: June 4th 2020. 
 
Wilcox, L. (2005) “Don DeLillo’s Libra: History as Text, History as Trauma,” 
Rethinking History, 9: 337-353. 
 
Žižek, S. (1991) “Grimaces of the Real, or When the Phallus Appears,” October, 58. 
 
Žižek, S. (1998) Tarrying with the Negative, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Žižek, S. (2000) The Ticklish Subject, New York, NY: Verso. 
 
Žižek, S. (2001) The Fright of Real Tears, London, UK: BFI. 
 
Žižek, S. (2006a) The Parallax View, Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press. 
 
Žižek, S. (2006b) “Beyond Discourse Analysis,” in R. Butler and S. Stephens (eds.), 
Interrogating the Real, London, UK: Bloomsbury. 
 




Žižek, S. (2008b) Enjoy Your Symptom! New York, NY: Routledge 
 
Žižek, S. (2013) Demanding the Impossible, edited by Yong-june park, Cambridge, 
UK: Polity 
 
Žižek, S. (2015) Absolute Recoil, London, UK: Verso. 
 
Žižek, S. (2016) Disparities, London, UK: Bloomsbury. 
 
Žižek, S. (2019) Incontinence of the Void, Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press. 
 
Žižek, S. (2018) Like a Thief in Broad Daylight, London, UK: Allen Lane. 
 
Žižek, S. (2020a) Sex and the Failed Absolute, London, UK: Bloomsbury. 
 
Žižek, S. (2020b) A Left that Dares to Speak Its Name, Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
 
Žižek, S. (2020c) Pandemic! COVID-19 Shakes the World, OR Books: New York. 
 
Žižek, S. and G. Daly (2004) Conversations with Žižek, Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
 
Zupančič, A. (2003) The Shortest Shadow, Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press. 
 
Zupančič, A. (2008) The Odd One In: On Comedy, Cambridge, MASS: The MIT 
Press. 
 
Zupančič, A. (2016) “You’d have to be stupid not to see that,” Parallax, 22: 413-425 
 
Zupančič, A. (2017) What is Sex? Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press. 
 
